Debak Das’ recent paper, Explaining the Proliferation of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, identifies a permissive environment in the non-proliferation regime shaped by three drivers for proliferation: first, the multipurpose or dual-use nature of the technology to deliver nuclear weapons; second, the definitional obscurity of what constitutes a “nuclear weapon;” and third, the exclusion of any legally enforceable legislation on delivery systems. Drawing from newly declassified sources from archives in India, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the paper argues that these drivers have permitted the transfer of nuclear delivery technology despite states’ purported commitments to non-proliferation. This is established through historical case studies of India’s acquisition of nuclear-capable Jaguar aircraft from the United Kingdom and space or missile technology from France. This study also highlights the different pathways that future proliferators might use to spread or develop nuclear delivery systems.

Carnegie India hosted Debak Das for a discussion on his research examining the proliferation of nuclear delivery systems and the structural gaps in the global non-proliferation regime that have enabled this proliferation. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

Gaps in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Participants discussed the structural limitations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and how these have allowed nuclear delivery systems to proliferate. While the regime regulates nuclear materials and weapons-related technologies, it does not comprehensively address the delivery vehicles, such as aircraft or missiles. While drafting the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to focus primarily on nuclear weapons, and as a result, delivery systems exist within a regulatory “grey zone.” Although arrangements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) attempt to restrict missile proliferation, they remain voluntary and lack strong enforcement mechanisms. Participants noted that this has allowed states to engage in arms sales, technological cooperation, or dual-use programs, and acquire delivery technologies without formally violating international commitments. Further, participants discussed how major treaties regulating nuclear weapons do not clearly define what constitutes a nuclear weapon or whether delivery systems should be considered along with them. This lack of clarity has also allowed states to interpret the rules to permit the transfer of delivery technologies while still claiming compliance with international norms.

Dual-Use Technologies and Strategic Incentives: Participants highlighted the role of dual-use technologies in facilitating proliferation. Many technologies that can be used for nuclear delivery have legitimate civilian or conventional military applications. For example, space launch vehicles used for satellite deployment can be adapted to serve as ballistic missiles, while aircraft designed for conventional warfare can also be modified to carry nuclear weapons. Participants examined how this ambiguity enables states to acquire capabilities that can later be repurposed for nuclear delivery and complicates efforts to regulate proliferation. Such obscurities allow states and non-state actors to exploit gaps as they have economic interests, geopolitical compulsions, and other such incentives. Strategic incentives can be particularly noted on the economic and geopolitical fronts. First, the generation of revenue from the supply of these dual-use technologies is significant for sustaining domestic defense industries in supplier countries and creates long-term dependence of recipient states for support, maintenance, and upgrades throughout their life cycle. Second, geopolitical considerations entail transfer of technologies to strengthen alliances, maintain influence over recipient countries, or counter the influence of rival powers. Additionally, prestige shapes arms transfers as supplying advanced military technology are a means for states to demonstrate technological sophistication and enhance their status.

India’s Acquisition of Nuclear Delivery Systems: To illustrate how suppliers and recipients operate within the permissive environment created by gaps in the non-proliferation regime, participants discussed India’s acquisition of nuclear delivery capabilities. Cooperation with France in civilian space technology during the 1960s and 1970s provided India with access to technologies that later contributed to the development of ballistic missile systems in the country. Technologies transferred under these arrangements were framed as civilian space cooperation but had clear potential military applications. Further, India’s acquisition of the Jaguar aircraft from the United Kingdom in the late 1970s was sold as a conventional strike platform, and its design allowed it to carry nuclear weapons with relatively minor modifications. Participants highlighted that British officials were aware of the aircraft’s potential nuclear role but proceeded with the sale due to economic considerations and competition with other suppliers.

Implications for the Future of Non-Proliferation Regime: Participants emphasized that the continued proliferation of delivery systems represents a significant vulnerability within the existing framework of nuclear governance. Moreover, uncertainty in geopolitical developments may push countries to acquire nuclear technology when they cannot develop it independently. For instance, security concerns in Europe have led to cooperation between the United Kingdom and France, as well as between Poland and Germany, on nuclear technology, thereby continuing patterns of nuclear proliferation. Addressing this challenge would require stronger regulation of dual-use technologies and more comprehensive international agreements covering missile and delivery system transfers. However, participants acknowledged that achieving such reforms would be difficult given competing geopolitical interests and the widespread civilian uses of many relevant technologies. At the same time, technological developments such as hypersonic weapons, submarine-based nuclear systems, advanced missile systems, and evolving aerospace capabilities are likely to further complicate efforts to control delivery system proliferation.

This summary was prepared by Serene Joshua, young ambassador, with the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India.